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Arbitration and the   Constitution
BY PETER B. “BO” RUTLEDGE, PROFESSOR OF LAW
Editor’s Note: During the 2010-11 academic year, Professor Bo 
Rutledge served as a Visiting Fulbright Professor at the Institut für 
Zivilverfahrensrecht at the University of Vienna School of Law in Austria. 
Rutledge is also the author of the forthcoming book Arbitration and the 
Constitution under contract with Cambridge University Press.
rbitration and the Constitution? At first glance, these two 
topics would appear to be strange bedfellows. 
The Constitution largely concerns the distribution of power 
among branches of the federal government, the relationship 
between federal and state governments, and the government’s 
relationship with the individual. With little exception, it does 
not address purely private conduct.
Arbitration, by comparison, is 
traditionally understood to be a 
largely private undertaking. 
In a run-of-the-mine case, parties 
include arbitration clauses in their 
contracts and thereby express a 
contractual preference to resolve 
their disputes out of court. Instead 
of a judge or jury, a private citizen 
(or panel of them), often chosen by 
the parties, resolves that dispute. 
Unlike judges, arbitrators are 
not bound to apply a particular 
set of procedural rules (unless the 
parties so request) and consequently enjoy a comparatively greater 
degree of procedural flexibility in how they resolve a dispute. The 
arbitrator’s decision then is final and binding on the parties. 
So what do these two systems – one largely concerned with 
state relations and one largely removed from state activity – have 
to do with each other?
For a long time, the answer was “not much.” A firm wall 
separated constitutional law from arbitration law. 
For the first 150 years of the republic, various doctrines 
supported this separation. 
Of central importance was the doctrine of jurisdictional ouster. 
Under this doctrine, predispute arbitration agreements were not 
enforceable because they attempted to “oust” courts of jurisdiction 
(similar doctrines operated to invalidate choice-of-forum and 
choice-of-law clauses during this period). As a matter of contract 
law, such agreements were void as contrary to public policy.
Things changed during the 1920s when Congress enacted 
the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). Modeled on New York’s 
arbitration law, the FAA made two critical changes in federal law. 
First, it overcame the century-old judicial hostility to 
arbitration agreements. Instead, such agreements were now 
enforceable “save upon such grounds as existed at law or in equity 
for the revocation of any contract.” 
Second, the FAA required courts to confirm arbitral awards 
(that is, convert them to judgments) subject to a limited number 
of defenses. Those defenses were largely limited to procedural 
defects (like biased arbitrators) and did not concern legal errors in 
the award (as might be the basis for an appellate court’s reversal of 
a district court’s decision).
While the FAA expanded the opportunities for arbitration, 
particularly in the commercial setting, significant constraints 
remained in the decades following its passage. 
Among them was the non-arbitrability doctrine. Under this 
doctrine, courts would not enforce arbitration agreements to the 
extent the underlying dispute involved a federal statutory claim 
(such as under the securities laws or the antitrust laws). 
The theory here was one of statutory interpretation – it would 
be inconsistent with the congressional grant of jurisdiction and 
would create a cause of action under these statutes to allow parties 
to sweep them out of court and into a private tribunal. 
While the decisions were not couched in explicitly 
constitutional terms, they reflected a set of constitutionally based 
concerns about the importance of federal courts and the process 
by which “public” disputes would be resolved. 
Beginning in the 1970s, three key changes significantly 
enhanced pressures on the wall separating arbitration and the 
Constitution.
First, the United States ratified the New York Convention. 
That treaty, heralded as one of the greatest achievements in private 
international law during the 20th century, obligated signatories to 
give effect to arbitration agreements and arbitration awards. 
Second, the United States began to enter into a series of 
bilateral investment treaties and trade treaties that included 
arbitration as the favored dispute resolution mechanism. 
During the late 1920s, cracks in 
the wall separating arbitration and 
the Constitution began to appear.
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Third, the U.S. Supreme Court systematically dismantled the 
non-arbitrability doctrine. 
By the early 1990s, most disputes, including those arising 
under federal laws like the antitrust and securities laws, were 
now arbitrable, whether they arose in the international or purely 
domestic context. 
Consequently, today, a variety of disputes – ranging from 
garden-variety disputes between credit card holders and their 
banks to disputes between Canadian softwood lumber producers 
and the U.S. Government – are subject to the same basic form 
of resolution: private arbitration, outside the courts under a 
procedurally flexible regime where the result is binding on the 
parties.
This brings us back to the relationship between arbitration 
and the Constitution. As arbitration has become a preferred 
form for the resolution of disputes, large and small, fissures have 
emerged in that wall separating these two fields. 
In a forthcoming book, I analyze those fissures systematically, 
but here let me identify four:  
Separation of Powers  Recall that one feature of arbitration is 
that the result is binding on the parties and that, as a consequence 
of the FAA, courts are largely obligated to confirm arbitral awards, 
thereby giving them the effect of a court-rendered judgment.
In international trade and investment treaties, the 
opportunities for judicial review are even more limited. 
How are such schemes consistent with Article III of the U.S. 
Constitution, which vests judicial power in the U.S. Supreme 
Court and lower federal courts? 
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When the Supreme Court invalidated provisions of the 
Bankruptcy Act in Northern Pipeline Co. v. Marathon Pipeline 
Co., it articulated a firm stance that Congress could not simply 
reallocate power to resolve private rights from the Article III 
courts to other entities that did not have the life tenure and 
independence associated with federal judges. 
Doesn’t arbitration do precisely that?
Due Process  Recall that another hallmark of arbitration is the 
procedural flexibility afforded to the arbitrator. 
How is this scheme consistent with the Due Process Clause? 
In a variety of cases, the Supreme Court has made clear 
that non-Article III entities cannot deprive individuals of 
constitutionally protected interests (like property) without 
procedural due process. 
But if arbitrators are not bound to follow any particular set 
of procedures, what guarantees does a party (particularly an 
individual litigant) have that her claim will be accorded due 
process? 
Is it sufficient to say that arbitration simply does not constitute 
state action and, thus, does not implicate the Constitution? If that 
is the case, then, does judicial confirmation of the award supply 
the state action? 
The Jury Right  Remember that arbitration typically occurs in 
front of a panel of one or more privately appointed arbitrators. 
How is this scheme consistent with the Seventh Amendment’s 
entitlement of a civil jury in most civil cases? 
The typical explanation is that individuals by opting into 
arbitration have waived their right to a jury. 
But is this necessarily so? Why should the jury right be 
alienable at all? And even if it should be, why should an 
arbitration clause (particularly if it makes no mention of a jury 
waiver) suffice to waive an important constitutional right? 
Federalism  As noted earlier, the FAA required courts to 
enforce arbitration agreements subject only to generally applicable 
contract defenses. 
Does federal or state law supply the relevant contract doctrine? 
If federal law does so, how is this consistent with Erie v. Tompkins, 
which declared an end to “general” federal common law?
If state law applies, does that not allow state governments to 
thwart Congress’ scheme by developing anti-arbitration doctrines?
Thus, arbitration raises a host of interesting constitutional 
questions, many of which are at the forefront of ongoing debates 
in the courts and in Congress. 
While the questions are interesting in their own right, even 
more interesting is how they have been addressed. 
Largely, the courts have resisted efforts to develop a formal 
“constitutional law of arbitration.” 
Instead, constitutional principles have seeped into the arbitral 
jurisprudence in more subtle ways. For example, courts have 
interpreted provisions of the previously referenced New York 
Convention to incorporate standards of procedural due process. 
Similarly, faced with an assault on arbitration following the 
demise of the non-arbitrability doctrine, arbitral institutions like 
the American Arbitration Association have committed themselves 
to administering some arbitrations according to “due process” 
protocols that employ constitutional-like concepts but do not 
expressly commit them to all of the accoutrements of procedural 
due process doctrine. 
Furthermore, drafters of international trade and investment 
treaties have designed implementing legislation in order to 
preserve safety valves for judicial review of certain questions in 
order to steer clear of any Article III controversies.
In conclusion, the story of arbitration and the Constitution 
is more than simply a story of how a once-disfavored form of 
dispute resolution has crept slowly into our legal lives. 
Instead, the history and developments teach us something 
deeper about how areas of the law influence each other, not 
simply on the basis of express doctrinal incorporation or 
development but rather through more subtle influences that 
filter into our legal dialogue through cracks in a wall that once 
separated the two fields.
“[A]rbitration raises a host 
of interesting constitutional 
questions, many of which are at 
the forefront of ongoing debates 
in the courts and in Congress.” 
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